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Sandbox Boundaries 
Hilary J. Allen1 
Around the world, subnational and national regulatory sandboxes are being 
adopted in an effort to promote fintech innovation.  These regulatory 
sandboxes seek to achieve this by rolling back some of the consumer 
protection and prudential regulations that would otherwise apply to the 
firms trialing their financial products and services in the sandbox.  While 
sacrificing such protections in order to promote innovation is problematic, 
such sacrifice may nonetheless be justifiable if, by working with innovators 
in the sandbox, regulators are educated about new technologies in a way 
that enhances their ability to effectively promote consumer protection and 
financial stability in other contexts. However, the market for fintech 
products and services transcends national and subnational borders, and this 
Essay predicts that as competition amongst countries for fintech business 
intensifies, the phenomena of regulatory arbitrage, race to the bottom, and 
coordination problems are likely to drive the regulatory sandbox model 
towards further deregulation, and disincentivize vital information sharing 
amongst financial regulators about new technologies.  By examining the 
case studies of the regulatory sandboxes adopted by Arizona and the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, as well as the proposals for 
transnational cooperation in the form of the Global Financial Innovation 
Network, this Essay suggests reason to be pessimistic about the prognosis 
for regulatory sandboxes in general, and information sharing across 
sandbox boundaries in particular.   
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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of using a “regulatory sandbox” to promote fintech 
innovation was pioneered by the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct 
Authority (“FCA”) in 2016.2  The FCA uses its sandbox to provide limited 
1 Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law.   
2 Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes 87 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. __ , __ (2019) (hereinafter, 
“Sandboxes”). 
2 Hilary J. Allen 
relief from financial regulation and enforcement, with the intention of 
reducing regulatory barriers to entry for fintech entrepreneurs who wish to 
test their innovations with real customers.3  Since 2016, several other 
countries around the world have adopted regulatory sandboxes for fintech – 
although what is meant by “regulatory sandbox” varies by jurisdiction.4  The 
term “fintech” itself also suffers from a lack of definitional consensus – it is 
perhaps best thought of as an umbrella term encompassing the latest wave of 
internet-enabled (and often data-driven) innovations, including cryptoassets 
and distributed ledger technologies, crowdfunding, mobile payments, 
marketplace lending, and robo-advisory services.5  These are all consumer-
facing products and services – some commentators take the view that the 
term “fintech” also encompasses big data, artificial intelligence, high 
frequency trading and blockchain-based applications that are developed by 
financial institutions (or their vendors) for use in-house.6   
Many of these fintech innovations are “being developed and 
deployed simultaneously in different financial markets”;7 the market for 
fintech products and services does not respect national borders.8  To date, 
however, regulatory sandboxes have only been created at national 
(sometimes even subnational) levels of government.  From a practical 
perspective, this often creates a mismatch between the regulatory regimes 
for fintech innovation and the markets that the innovators wish to serve.  As 
a response to this mismatch, the FCA has spearheaded the formation of a 
“Global Financial Innovation Network” of financial regulators (the 
“GFIN”).9  While the FCA had originally envisaged that the GFIN would 
coordinate a global regulatory sandbox that would facilitate multilateral 
trials of fintech innovations, it has since walked back that ambition in face 
of practical challenges.10  Instead, the GFIN is focused on coordinating 
regulators overseeing simultaneous cross-border trails.11 
3 Financial Conduct Authority, Regulatory Sandboxes (first published May 11, 2015; last 
updated April 29, 2019) (available at https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox). 
4 Sandboxes, supra Note 2 at __.  
5 Id at __. 
6 Id. at __. 
7 Global Financial Innovation Network (GFIN) Consultation Document, 3 (Aug. 2018) 
(available at https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/bcfp_global-financial-
innovation-network_consultation-document.pdf). 
8 In particular, the technologies of “AI, distributed ledger technology, data protection, 
regulation of securities and ICOs, know your customer (KYC) or anti-money laundering 
(AML), and green finance” are being developed on a global scale.  GFIN Consultation 
Document, supra note 7 at 4. 
9 Id. 
10 Gina Conheady, Is Fintech Ready for a Global Regulatory Sandbox? (Nov. 27, 2018) 
(available at https://www.algoodbody.com/insights-publications/is-fintech-ready-for-a-
global-regulatory-sandbox). 
11 GFIN Consultation Document, supra note 7 at 6. 
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The GFIN, as well as the sandboxes recently adopted by the state of 
Arizona and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), are used 
as case studies in this Essay.  These case studies afford an opportunity to 
reexamine the literature on regulatory arbitrage, races to the bottom, and 
coordination problems in the context of a borderless market for financial 
services that is being transformed by fintech innovations.  This Essay 
demonstrates that a nuanced view of these phenomena, one that embraces 
the complexities of the incentives of public and private actors, is necessary 
to explain the evolution of sandboxes to date, and to make any predictions 
about how they are likely to develop in the future.   
I have previously argued that the key benefit of the regulatory 
sandbox model is its ability to educate regulators on new technologies; that 
is the best justification that can be offered for a regulatory model that 
otherwise undoes prudential and consumer protection rules in the name of 
promoting innovation and competition.12  This Essay will therefore explore 
how the information-generating characteristics of the regulatory sandbox 
will interplay with our understanding of regulatory arbitrage, races to the 
bottom, and coordination problems. Unfortunately, this Essay concludes that 
incentives are strong to cloister information within individual regulatory 
sandboxes, rather than sharing it across sandbox boundaries to improve 
regulatory practices everywhere.   
The remainder of this Essay will proceed as follows: Part II will 
provide some background on the current state of regulatory sandboxes 
around the world, by explaining what they are and where they have been 
adopted.  Part III will consider regulatory sandboxes in a more theoretical 
light, by exploring the competing regulatory goals implicated by the 
sandbox model.  Part IV will provide a brief introduction to the literature on 
regulatory arbitrage, races to the bottom, and coordination problems, before 
using the GFIN and the Arizona and CFPB regulatory sandboxes as case 
studies that demonstrate the need for a nuanced understanding of these 
concepts.  In so doing, Part IV provides reasons to be pessimistic about the 
evolution of regulatory sandboxes, both because of their potential to undo 
protections for consumers and the financial system more broadly, and 
because of the incentives that exist to stymie the flow of information about 
innovation amongst regulators.  Part V concludes.  
II. WHAT ARE REGULATORY SANDBOXES AND WHO HAS ADOPTED THEM?
The financial industry is highly regulated, and so technology 
entrepreneurs seeking to enter the market for financial services often face 
significant regulatory barriers to entry.13  Even for established financial 
institutions, determining how regulation will apply to a new financial 
12 Sandboxes, supra Note 2 at __. 
13 Id. at __. 
4 Hilary J. Allen 
product can be a daunting and expensive exercise.14  Responding to 
regulation’s potential to hinder innovation by both startups and regulated 
entities, several jurisdictions around the world have adopted “regulatory 
sandboxes” designed to allow innovators to conduct a limited test of fintech 
products and services in a lenient regulatory environment.15  The United 
Kingdom’s FCA was the first to implement a fintech regulatory sandbox – 
since its inception in 2016, a number of other jurisdictions (including 
Australia, Bahrain, Brunei, Canada, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, the Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand and the UAE) 
have followed its lead.16  
It is important to note that there has been significant variance in the 
forms of the regulatory sandboxes that have been adopted.  The term 
“regulatory sandbox” often means different things in different places.17  One 
summary of sandbox objectives around the world highlights this variance – 
depending on the jurisdiction, sandboxes may be adopted in order to: 
• Support financial innovation and FinTech firms who are seeking
to offer innovative new products, services or business models. 
• Foster a financial services system that is more efficient and
manages risks more effectively. 
• Understand how emerging technologies and business models
interact with the regulatory framework and where it may lead to 
barriers to entry.  
• Promote effective competition in the interest of consumers.
• Promote financial inclusion for consumers.18
There is also significant variation in the practical implementation of 
regulatory sandboxes around the world. Some jurisdictions allow a broad 
range of financial products and services to be tested in sandboxes, whereas 
others (such as Australia and Hong Kong) are much more restrictive.19  
Most jurisdictions place limitations on the duration of testing (typically, 
from six months to two years),20 but a few outliers do not specify any limit 
14 Id. at __. 
15 Id. at __. 
16 Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Janos N. Barberis and Douglas W. Arner, Regulating 
a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation, 27 (available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3018534). 
17 Sandboxes, supra Note 2 at __. 
18 GFIN Consultation Document, supra note 7 at 17. 
19 For a discussion of the limitations on the Australian sandbox, see Sandboxes, supra Note 
2 at __.  The Hong Kong sandbox is only available to licensed banks and technology firms 
that partner with licensed banks.  Honk Kong Monetary Authority, Fintech Supervisory 
Sandbox (available at https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-functions/international-financial-
centre/fintech-supervisory-sandbox.shtml). 
20 GFIN Consultation Document, supra note 7 at 8. 
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on the duration of the sandbox trial.21  The UK’s regulatory sandbox was 
structured to promote iterative dialogue between innovators and regulators, 
but other jurisdictions (notably, Australia) have done less to promote this 
type of interaction.22 
The United States’ Congress has not yet taken any action to 
implement a regulatory sandbox at the federal level.  While some states have 
adopted or are contemplating adopting regulatory sandboxes (Arizona 
became the first U.S. state to formally adopt a regulatory sandbox in March 
of 2018,23 and a sandbox bill is pending in Illinois),24 such sandboxes can 
only allow for access to consumers resident in their state.  At the federal 
level, the CFPB has attempted to implement a regulatory sandbox by way of 
executive action, but the legality of that effort is uncertain. 
By way of background, in December 2018, the CFPB issued a 
“Policy on No-Action Letters and the BCFP Product Sandbox”.25  This 
Policy was designed as an update to the CFPB’s Project Catalyst, which 
permitted “innovative financial firms [to] apply for “no-action letters.””26  
Project Catalyst did not allow the CFBP to provide relief from enforcement 
from the States, or any other federal financial regulatory authority, and so its 
utility was limited (only one firm sought a no-action letter from the CFPB in 
connection with Project Catalyst).27  The new CFPB sandbox is designed to 
provide two years of exemptive relief to applicants, and the Policy purports 
to make the recipients of such exemptive relief “immune from enforcement 
actions by any Federal or State Authorities, as well as from lawsuits brought 
by private parties”.28  However, this attempt at preemption has been 
criticized as overreaching by twenty-two state attorneys general, who have 
argued that the CFBP “cannot give applicants such a blanket safe harbor 
protecting them from enforcement actions by state and federal authorities.”29 
The Conference of State Bank Supervisors has also issued a letter stating 
21 These jurisdictions include Hong Kong and Singapore.  See Baker Mackenzie, A Guide 
to Regulatory Sandboxes Across Asia Pacific (available at 
https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-
/media/files/insight/publications/2018/01/qrg_ap_regulatoryfintech_jan18.pdf?la=en).  
22 Sandboxes, supra Note 2 at __. 
23 Arizona Attorney-General Mark Brnovich, Arizona Becomes First State in U.S. to Offer 
Fintech Regulatory Sandbox (available at https://www.azag.gov/press-release/arizona-
becomes-first-state-us-offer-fintech-regulatory-sandbox). 
24 Illinois SB3133. 
25 Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB), Policy on No-Action Letters and the 
BCFP Product Sandbox, 83 CFR 64036 (2018). 
26 Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. 
Rev. 232, 260 (2018). 
27 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Announces First No-Action Letter to 
Upstart Network (Sep. 14, 2017) (available at https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-announces-first-no-action-letter-upstart-network/). 
28 CFPB, supra Note 25 at 64042. 
29 Kate Berry, State AGs Assail CFPB Plan to Build Fintech Sandbox, AMERICAN 
BANKER (Feb. 12, 2019).  
6 Hilary J. Allen 
that “State regulators believe the extent of this relief exceeds the authority of 
the Bureau under Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act. While the Bureau can 
choose not to enforce federal consumer financial laws under its purview, the 
Bureau is not authorized to prevent state officials from enforcing federal 
consumer financial laws.”30 It is therefore uncertain whether any federal 
regulatory sandbox is available in the United States.   
There is also significant uncertainty about how to approach fintech at 
the transnational level.  While international financial regulatory bodies like 
IOSCO and the FSB have highlighted issues relating to fintech business 
models, they have not yet attempted any concrete solutions or standards. 
Instead, their activities could best be described as monitoring, and 
generating research reports.31  In January 2019, however, the UK’s FCA 
helped found the GFIN, a transnational body focused on providing more 
concrete responses to the rise of fintech.32   
The GFIN’s primary functions are: 
1. to act as a network of regulators to collaborate and share experience
of innovation in respective markets, including emerging technologies
and business models, and to provide accessible regulatory contact
information for firms;
2. to provide a forum for joint RegTech work and collaborative
knowledge sharing/lessons learned; and
3. to provide firms with an environment in which to trial cross-border
solutions.33
The GFIN’s ambitions to be a network and discussion forum for 
national regulatory bodies are not particularly novel (when considered in the 
context of existing international financial regulatory bodies like the FSB and 
IOSCO),34 but the GFIN’s ambition to facilitate cross-border trials for new 
30 Letter of Paul Ryan of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors to Paul Watkins of the 
CFPB (Feb. 11, 2019) (available at https://www.csbs.org/sites/default/files/2019-
02/CSBS%20Letter--
CFPB%20NAL%20Policy%20Revisions%20and%20Product%20Sandbox_%20021119%2
0FINAL%20NOSIG.pdf). 
31 See, for example, Financial Stability Board, FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS 
FROM FINTECH: SUPERVISORY AND REGULATORY ISUES THAT MERIT 
AUTHORITIES’ ATTENTION (Jun. 27, 2017) (available at http://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/R270617.pdf); IOSCO, IOSCO RESEARCH REPORT ON FINANCIAL 
TECHNOLOGIES (FINTECH) (Feb. 2017) (available at 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD554.pdf). 
32 Conheady, supra Note 10. 
33 Terms of Reference for Membership and Governance of the Global Financial Innovation 
Network (GFIN), 1 (available at https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/mou/gfin-terms-of-
reference.pdf). 
34 For a discussion of the architecture of international financial law, see Chris Brummer, 
SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, 60 et seq. (2012). 
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technologies is a new development.  While the FCA had initially envisaged 
“a full multilateral sandbox that allows concurrent testing and launch across 
multiple jurisdictions”, the level of regulatory coordination necessary for a 
project has been conceded as too ambitious for now.35  However, even 
bilateral coordination on sandbox trials is likely to prove an interesting 
experiment.  Although the GFIN has made clear that it does not desire to be 
“active in emerging trends, assessing and articulating international 
standards, and best practices”,36 the cooperation of its members on cross-
border sandbox testing will certainly be treated as a resource in developing 
best practices for sandbox development. 
III. THE COMPETING REGULATORY GOALS IMPLICATED BY SANDBOXES
There are competing visions for regulatory sandboxes at the state, 
federal and international level.  These competing visions revive old 
questions about regulatory arbitrage, races to the bottom, and coordination, 
and require us to reckon with how our theoretical understanding of such 
concepts applies in the context of a post-Financial Crisis world animated by 
new fintech technologies.  To provide further background for such a 
discussion in Section IV, this Section will consider the goals that drive 
financial regulatory policies, and see how they may conflict as jurisdictions 
consider how to address fintech generally, and more specifically, whether to 
adopt regulatory sandboxes. 
In their book Principles of Financial Regulation, Armour et al. 
identify the protection of consumers (and investors), financial stability, 
market efficiency, and competition (as well as preventing financial crime) as 
the primary goals of financial regulation.37  Regulatory policy can 
sometimes promote all of these goals, but often the goals will conflict and in 
some contexts it will be necessary to prioritize some goals over others.38  
Policymakers that adopt regulatory sandboxes are often doing so in order to 
further the goals of efficiency and to promote competition.39  Their hope is 
that sandboxes will incentivize innovation that enables cheaper and more 
efficient delivery of financial services,40 and that sandboxes will also 
promote the competitiveness of a jurisdiction by enabling it to attract 
innovative businesses who will provide tax revenue and employment 
opportunities.41  Some sandboxes also speak of promoting consumer 
welfare, particularly by broadening access to and reducing the cost of 
35 Conheady, supra Note 10. 
36 GFIN Consultation Document, supra note 7 at 7. 
37 John Armour et al, Principles of Financial Regulation, 61-69 (2016). 
38 Hilary J. Allen, The SEC as Financial Stability Regulator, 43 J. Corp. L. 715, 730 (2018). 
39 GFIN Consultation Document, supra note 7 at 17. 
40 FCA, REGULATORY SANDBOXES LESSONS LEARNED REPORT, 9 (Oct. 2017) 
(available at https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research-and-data/regulatory-sandbox-
lessons-learned-report.pdf). 
41 Zetzsche et al., supra Note 16 at 41-2. 
8 Hilary J. Allen 
financial services.42  Others sandboxes have the stated goal of improving 
risk management,43 which may ultimately be beneficial from a financial 
stability perspective.  The fact remains, however, that the regulatory barriers 
to entry that regulatory sandboxes seek to remove are typically regulations 
that protect consumers and/or the stability of the financial system.  As 
regulatory sandboxes are being adopted around the world, the primary 
purpose for doing so seems to be the promotion of efficiency and 
competition.44   
Except in the immediate aftermath of a crisis, there tends not to be 
any constituency agitating for improved consumer protection and financial 
stability regulation – at least, not an organized constituency that can match 
the intensity of the interests seeking to roll back such regulation.45  To the 
extent that regulators agree to roll back consumer protection and financial 
stability regulations for firms conducting sandbox trials, regulatory 
sandboxes can be viewed as a type of deregulation that can harm an 
unrepresented public. While it might be theoretically possible to replace 
consumer protection and financial stability rules with alternative 
arrangements (such as principles-based regulatory regimes) that are less 
burdensome on innovators but equally effective in protecting consumers and 
financial stability, principles-based regimes can easily devolve into 
deregulation if they are not properly staffed and resourced.46  Such an 
outcome is particularly likely if the subject matter of the regime is highly 
complex and thus may defy regulatory understanding and incentivize 
deference to the regulated industry47 – a real concern when dealing with 
complicated financial algorithms and other fintech innovations.48  
Sandboxes thus have very real deregulatory potential – but they can also 
afford some benefits to financial regulators seeking to promote consumer 
protection and financial stability. All such regulators share the need to 
understand the technology that is used to provide financial services, and I 
have argued that the most beneficial aspect of a regulatory sandbox is that it 
42 GFIN Consultation Document, supra note 7 at 17. 
43 Id. 
44 Zetzsche et al., supra Note 16 at 41-2. 
45 John C. Coffee, The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to 
be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1021 (2012). 
46 For a discussion of the deregulatory impact of the principles-based regime adopted by the 
FSA (the FCA’s predecessor), see Sandboxes, supra Note 2 at __. 
47 “Without countervailing, independent-minded regulatory power to push back against self-
interested industry conduct, the “creep” may run downwards – to more risk, less 
transparency, less systemic stability, and less consumer protection.”  Cristie Ford, New 
Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons from Financial Regulation, 2010 WIS. 
L. REV. 441, 479 (2010). 
48 “[I]f regulators come to rely on the providers of complex financial products and services 
for explanations about how they work, the result may be that regulation ultimately comes to 
reflect the worldview of the financial industry, rather than the objectives of society as a 
whole (this phenomenon is often referred to as “cognitive capture”).” Sandboxes, supra 
Note 2 at __. 
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provides a partial solution to the informational challenges that financial 
regulators face when dealing with new technologies.49  I have therefore 
argued that sandboxes should be carefully designed to maximize 
information production and sharing, and to minimize harms to consumers 
and the financial system.50 
However, at this early stage, it is difficult to make concrete 
judgments about the extent to which regulatory sandboxes and the fintech 
innovations they promote are in fact sacrificing consumer protection or 
financial stability.51  For example, we do not yet fully comprehend the scope 
of the discrimination and privacy violations that consumers may be 
subjected to by financial algorithms capable of artificial intelligence.52  Nor 
do we fully comprehend the financial stability implications of delegating 
financial risk-management to such algorithms.53  This is an argument for 
caution with respect to rolling back regulatory protections in regulatory 
sandboxes: as twenty-two State Attorneys-General stated in a letter to the 
CFPB, “The use of sophisticated technologies in the consumer financial 
market is not well understood, even by the creators of such 
technologies…Unless and until these technologies – and their implications 
for consumers – can be better understood, it would be irresponsible to give 
companies employing them what may effectively be a permanent get-out-of-
jail-free card.”54  
Even the benefits of regulatory sandboxes for industry 
competitiveness are difficult to judge at this stage: fintech sandboxes have 
only been around since 2016, and so there are very limited empirical data 
from which to draw any conclusions about the extent to which sandboxes 
are succeeding in promoting competition.55  In such an environment of 
uncertainty, policymakers’ decisions about whether to adopt and how to 
implement a regulatory sandbox are likely to be driven by value judgments 
about which regulatory goals to prioritize, and by political considerations.  
The choice of regulatory goals is likely to be impacted by the mandates of 
the various financial regulators implementing the regulatory sandbox.  For 
example, the UK’s FCA, the progenitor of the fintech regulatory sandbox 
49 For a discussion of the difficulties that regulators face in finding out about the existence 
or new products and services, let alone understanding their complexities, see Hilary J. 
Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation, 45 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 173, 209 
(2013). 
50 Sandboxes, supra Note 2 at __. 
51 Id. at __.  
52 Frank Pasquale, Exploring the Fintech Landscape, Written Testimony before the United 
States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 3-4 (Sep. 12, 2017) 
(available at https://www.banking.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/0a92ad09-6834-4d7e-
901a-6ae5c51572ae/6F5BB3DB26E6C8891F7A5627A3678DCE.pasquale-testimony-9-12-
17.pdf).
53 Hilary J. Allen, Driverless Finance (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
54 Berry, supra Note 29. 
55 Sandboxes, supra Note 2 at __. 
10 Hilary J. Allen 
concept, has a mandate to promote competition that most US financial 
regulators lack.56  In general, mandates to promote competition or efficiency 
are likely to render a regulator more hospitable to the promotion of 
technological innovation, which may help explain the FCA’s enthusiasm for 
the regulatory sandbox model.  However, I (and others) have previously 
argued that because of the breadth of the harm that financial crises can 
occasion, financial stability regulation should be the apex concern of any 
regulatory regime.57  Consumer protection should also be a priority, to the 
extent that vulnerable consumers (unlike the industry providing them with 
products and services) are often unable to organize to protect themselves.58  
However, regulatory arbitrage, races to the bottom and coordination 
problems associated with regulatory sandboxes may ultimately undermine 
these important goals. 
IV. REGULATORY ARBITRAGE, RACES TO THE BOTTOM AND COORDINATION
PROBLEMS 
(A) Theory and History 
Regulatory arbitrage, races to the bottom and coordination problems 
are perennial issues in both domestic and international financial regulation. 
By way of background, Fleischer has defined “regulatory arbitrage” as “a 
perfectly legal planning technique used to avoid taxes, accounting rules, 
securities disclosure, and other regulatory costs. Regulatory arbitrage 
exploits the gap between the economic substance of a transaction and its 
legal or regulatory treatment”.59  There are many strategies that can be used 
to achieve an economically equivalent outcome while avoiding legal 
constraints – in this Essay, I focus on the jurisdictional variant of regulatory 
arbitrage, whereby a market participant chooses to conduct business in a 
jurisdiction which affords a more favorable regulatory treatment to the 
business in question.60  Jurisdictional arbitrage opportunities abound at the 
international level, and also within a federal system like the United States 
where market participants can pick and choose amongst different federal 
and state regulators.  The ability for a market participant to choose their own 
regulator can lead to what is known as a “race to the bottom”, where 
jurisdictions compete to lower their regulatory standards in order to attract 
business, resulting in a general deregulatory trend.61  One jurisdiction’s 
lowering of regulatory standards can have spillover effects, generating 
negative externalities that are felt even in jurisdictions with more stringent 
56 Financial Services and Markets Act (2000), Section 1E (UK). 
57 Hilary J. Allen, Driverless Finance (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
58 See Note 45 and accompanying text. 
59 Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010). 
60 Elizabeth Pollman, Tech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and Limits, 8 (2019) (available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3393288). 
61 For a discussion of the dynamics of “races to the bottom”, see Carnell, Macey & Miller, 
THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, 5th ed., 65 (2013). 
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legal regimes;62 if a jurisdiction recognizes that its consumers and financial 
system may be harmed regardless of its own regulatory protections, it may 
seem logical to focus instead on reaping the benefits of innovation and 
competition by lowering regulatory standards itself.   
Jurisdictional arbitrage and races to the bottom are often viewed as 
problems best solved by agreements to apply consistently high standards 
across jurisdictions.63  If interpreted as simple coordination problems,64 
regulatory arbitrage and races to the bottom can be solved so long as 
jurisdictions share the information necessary to formulate the optimal 
regulatory solution, and trust one another enough to commit to that 
solution.65  A more realistic perspective, however, recognizes that there is 
no one solution that is optimal for all parties involved: even with perfect 
information and trust, coordination can be elusive when jurisdictions have 
different incentives and policy preferences that they are trying to pursue.66  
As a result, the financial regulatory goals of consumer protection and 
financial stability (which, in the absence of a crisis, often lack an organized 
constituency to agitate for them)67 have often been undercut by the forces of 
regulatory arbitrage and races to the bottom, facilitated by factions who 
prefer the regulatory goals of efficiency and competition.   
Such dynamics have been witnessed at both the domestic and 
international levels.  Domestically, these dynamics have generally been 
discussed under the rubric of “preemption”.  Since the enactment of the 
National Bank Act in the 1860s, banks in the United States have had the 
option to charter at the national or the state level.68  The implementation of 
this dual banking system ensured that issues regarding the extent to which 
62 Coffee notes that when it comes to financial stability, “many nations do not have to 
internalize the costs they impose on others, some nations will behave as “free riders,” 
preferring that others bear the costs and encouraging regulatory arbitrage when it benefits 
them.” John C. Coffee, Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can’t Come Home, 
99 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1269 (2014). 
63 “[T]he prevailing wisdom is that regulatory arbitrage can be counteracted by 
harmonization”. Pollman, supra Note 60 at 2.  There are, however, some scholars who 
object to harmonization either because of its second order effects, or because harmonization 
can generate further opportunities for regulatory arbitrage in the implementation phase.  For 
a discussion of the work of these scholars, see Hilary J. Allen, What is “Financial 
Stability”? The Need for Some Common Language in International Financial Regulation, 
45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 929, 938-9 (2014).   
64 Coordination problems “are rooted in the need of certain kinds of uniformity on the one 
hand, and the absence of any inherent tendency for such uniformity spontaneously to 
emerge on the other hand.”  Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems: The 
Structure of Procyclicality in Financial and Monetary Markets, Macroeconomies, and 
Formally Similar Contexts, 3 J. FIN. PERSP. 1, 2 (2015).  
65 Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (And How It Doesn’t), 99 
GEO. L. J. 257, 269-70 (2011). 
66 Id. 
67 See Note 45 and accompanying text. 
68 Carnell, Macey & Miller, supra Note 61 at 78. 
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federal financial regulation can preempt state financial regulation (and vice 
versa) have been alive for over a century.  Over the years, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (the national bank regulator) has often sought 
to preempt – and often succeeded in preempting – state regulators trying to 
implement more stringent consumer financial protections.69  In the lead up 
to the Financial Crisis, other federal regulators also paid limited attention to 
consumer financial protection with disastrous results,70 and it took the 
Financial Crisis to galvanize support for more robust consumer financial 
protection regulation.  The Dodd-Frank legislation enacted in the aftermath 
of the Financial Crisis sought to alter the status quo in two ways.  First, it 
sought to reverse some of the federal preemption authority by increasing 
“both the lawmaking and law enforcement functions of the states in the area 
of consumer financial protection.”71  Second, it created a new federal agency 
in the form of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, with a mandate to 
“to implement and, where applicable, enforce Federal consumer financial 
law consistently for the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access 
to markets for consumer financial products and services and that markets for 
consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, and 
competitive.”72  Given that these steps were taken to avoid races to the 
bottom in the area of consumer financial protection regulation, there is an 
unmistakable irony in the CFPB now seeking to utilize the regulatory 
sandbox model to preempt state consumer financial protection laws (an 
issue this Essay will return to shortly). 
At the international level, the primary concern is with regulatory 
arbitrage and races to the bottom with regard to financial stability 
regulation: the genesis of international financial regulation in the 1970s 
sprang from national concerns about spillover effects communicated from 
one jurisdiction to another by globalized capital flows.73  An international 
consensus has since developed that the best way to avoid spillover effects is 
to coordinate the rules that apply to international financial activity, and 
international financial regulation has developed as a compilation of 
harmonized international standards.74 However, the international financial 
regulatory standards adopted prior to 2008 were insufficient to prevent a 
global financial crisis in the form of a “subprime mortgage crisis in the 
69 See, for example, the seminal cases of Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First 
of Omaha Service Corp. 439 U.S. 299 (1978), and Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. 
Nelson 518 U.S. 25 (1996). 
70 Kennedy, McCoy & Bernstein, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial 
Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1145 (2012). 
71 Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Expansion of State Authority to Protect 
Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 896 (2011). 
72 Dodd-Frank Section 1021; See also Kennedy, McCoy & Bernstein, supra Note 70 at 
1145. 
73 Brummer, supra Note 65 at 265-267. 
74 Id. at 268-269. 
 Sandbox Boundaries      13 
United States [that] acted as a trigger for a global bank run”.75  In response, 
there was significant international regulatory activity with the goal of 
making the global financial system more resilient to a shock emanating from 
any one country,76 but concerns about cross-border spillover effects remain 
notwithstanding this post-crisis reform.  Part of the reason why there are still 
vulnerabilities in the international financial regulatory system is the 
fragmented nature of the international financial regulatory standards adopted 
to address those vulnerabilities (a reflection of the fragmentation of 
jurisdiction amongst United States’ domestic financial regulators).77  The 
gaps between the standards provide opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, 
and agile new fintech technologies are likely to be particularly adept at 
exploiting these regulatory gaps.78  International vulnerabilities have also 
been exacerbated by the increased use of the internet to facilitate the 
provision of financial services across national borders.79   
(B) Application to Regulatory Sandboxes 
Understanding the standard accounts of preemption and international 
harmonization can assist us (at least to some degree) in understanding recent 
developments in regulatory sandboxes.  For example, Arizona could be 
viewed as having lowered regulatory protections for consumers in order to 
encourage fintech entrepreneurs to set up in Arizona and thus arbitrage the 
regulatory environment of their home states.80  Arizona’s actions could 
potentially spur a race to the bottom as states like Illinois and others 
contemplate their own regulatory sandboxes.  While the CFPB could 
arguably invoke federal preemption to set a floor requiring Arizona and 
other states to maintain more stringent consumer protection rules, the CFPB 
has not evinced any desire to do so, and so there is no legal limit on 
innovators taking advantage of Arizona’s lowered regulatory standards. 
In fact, the CFPB has purported to create its own regulatory sandbox 
that preempts consumer financial protection laws at both the state and 
federal level. The CFPB sandbox is designed to offer two years of relief 
75 Hilary J. Allen, What is “Financial Stability”? The Need for Some Common Language in 
International Financial Regulation, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 929, 930 (2014).   
76 Brummer, supra Note 65 at 265. 
77 Abraham L. Newman & Elliot Posner, VOLUNTARY DISRUPTIONS: 
INTERNATIONAL SOFT LAW, FINANCE AND POWER, 45 (2018). 
78 Pollman, supra Note 60 at 4. 
79 Rosa Lastra and Jason Grant Allen, Cyberspace and Fintech Borders, 
FINTECHPOLICY.ORG (Jan. 21, 2019). 
80 Zetzsche et al. have argued that one of the primary reasons for adopting a regulatory 
sandbox is its “signaling” function, in that it demonstrates a commitment to promoting 
fintech innovation in the hope of attracting entrepreneurs to the jurisdiction.   Dirk A. 
Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Janos N. Barberis and Douglas W. Arner, Regulating a 
Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation, 41-2 (available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3018534). 
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from regulatory compliance81 – this is longer than most jurisdictions offer, 
but not entirely an outlier position.  What is an outlier (when compared with 
other sandboxes) is that relief need not be sought by individual firms – 
instead, “[t]he Bureau invites applications from trade associations, service 
providers and other third parties.”82  This will allow for much more 
expansive grants of regulatory relief than the typical sandbox, and if these 
grants preempt other state and federal consumer protection law, the CFPB’s 
regulatory sandbox could become a potent force for deregulation. 
The CFPB is also a member of GFIN, the Global Financial 
Innovation Network spearheaded by the UK’s FCA.  A simplistic account of 
the GFIN might view it simply as a coordination mechanism, an attempt by 
nations to develop apolitical and expert best practices as to the operation of 
a regulatory sandbox that maximizes efficiency and promote competition, 
while minimizing harm to consumers and financial stability.  Taking this 
account further, once in place, such best practices should serve a 
coordination function, preventing regulatory arbitrage and races to the 
bottom with respect to the regulation of fintech innovation.  For example, 
one commentator has noted that former tax havens, having capitulated to 
pressure to meet international standards with regard to preventing tax 
avoidance and evasion, are now increasingly adopting loose financial 
regulatory regimes to attract businesses associated with cryptoassets and 
blockchain.83  This is perhaps the beginning of a race to the bottom, and the 
GFIN could theoretically play a role in arresting it.   
The analysis in this Part B, however, relies entirely on simplistic 
theoretical foundations and is thus incomplete.  It does not provide a 
compelling description of developments relating to regulatory sandboxes, 
because it does not contemplate the non-legal limits on using regulatory 
sandboxes as a tool for arbitrage, nor does it consider the potentially 
conflicting incentives of actors within a jurisdiction that decides to adopt or 
not adopt a sandbox.  Furthermore, the second order effects that may flow 
from adopting regulatory sandboxes are missing from this Part B (and 
anticipated second order effects may be a key reason why an actor was for 
or against a sandbox in the first place). Finally, this Part B does not take into 
account the sensitivity and value of the information likely to be generated by 
regulatory sandboxes.  The following Part C relies on cutting edge literature 
to provide a more complete description of trends with regard to regulatory 
sandboxes, and from these descriptions, is able to draw some normative 
conclusions. 
81 Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Policy on No-Action Letters and the BCFP 
Product Sandbox, 83 CFR 64036, 64037 (2018). 
82 Id. at 64043 
83 Omri Marian, Blockchain Havens and the Need for Their Internationally-Coordinated 
Regulation, 2 (2019) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3357168). 
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 (C) Towards a More Nuanced Understanding of Regulatory Sandboxes 
This Part C relies on recent literature on the incentives of political 
actors and the innovators themselves to develop a much more nuanced 
understanding of why regulatory sandboxes are being pursued, and how 
effective they are likely to be.  For example, legal scholar Elizabeth Pollman 
has recently explored some of the non-legal constraints on technological 
innovators that limit their desire and ability to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage84 – these help explain the limited appeal of Arizona’s sandbox.  A 
state-based regulatory sandbox obviously only provides an innovator with 
access to consumers resident in that state,85 but Pollman has observed that 
the availability of a skilled workforce, and a founder’s desire to live and 
work in a particular place, also act as a type of constraint that prevents 
entrepreneurs from simply moving their business to the most lightly 
regulated environment.86  This may explain why, to date, only six firms have 
taken advantage of Arizona’s sandbox.87  At this scale, Arizona’s sandbox 
provides only limited arbitrage opportunities, and is unlikely to inspire a 
problematic race to the bottom – in other words, the regulatory goals of 
consumer protection and financial stability are unlikely to suffer too much 
as a result of Arizona adopting its sandbox. 
Pollman has also highlighted that technology services often require 
consumer trust and social legitimacy to thrive88 – this is likely to be a 
foritiori the case in the context of the technological delivery of financial 
products, which are credence goods (in the sense that a customer cannot 
immediately verify the quality or utility of the financial product, and thus 
must trust in the provider).89  If the CFPB’s sandbox is interpreted by 
financial consumers as a backdoor for deregulation (a real possibility, given 
the publicity regarding the CFPB’s deregulatory turn under the Trump 
Administration), consumers may be unwilling to participate in its sandbox 
trials, thwarting attempts by innovators to test their products.  Furthermore, 
many state regulators and attorneys-general are threatening to challenge any 
concrete assertion by the CFPB of its sandbox’s preemptory powers.90  
These concerns about the participation of consumers, as well as legal 
challenges to the preemptive aspects of the CFPB’s sandbox, may ultimately 
render it unattractive to innovators.  As with the Arizona sandbox, concerns 
84 Pollman, supra Note 60. 
85 Sandboxes, supra Note 2 at __. 
86 Pollman, supra Note 60 at 28-30. 
87 Arizona Attorney General Mark Brnovich, Sandbox Participants (available at 
https://www.azag.gov/fintech/participants). 
88 Pollman, supra Note 60 at 23-24. 
89 Iris H-Y Chiu, Fintech and Disruptive Business Models in Financial Products, 
Intermediation and Markets – Policy Implications for Financial Regulators, 21 J. TECH. L. 
& POL’Y 55, 74 (2016). 
90 See Notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
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about regulatory arbitrage and races to the bottom may be neutered by 
limited uptake of the regulatory sandbox.  
The CFPB is trying to build legitimacy for its sandbox in another 
arena, however – it is the only US regulator to have joined the GFIN.91  In 
their book “Voluntary Disruptions”, political scientists Newman and Posner 
highlight that international financial regulation is sometimes used as a tool 
to help factions promote their agendas domestically.92  They observe that 
when policy actors find themselves blocked at the domestic level, they will 
sometimes seek to “expand the arena” to include transnational negotiations, 
allowing them to disrupt the domestic policy debate.93  If the GFIN 
ultimately develops international best practices for sandbox design, the 
CFPB may be able to invoke these best practices in order to lend legitimacy 
to its regulatory sandbox, with the goal of making it harder for US states to 
challenge the sandbox and thus rendering it more attractive to innovators.  
However, the fact that the CFPB is the only US regulator that is a member 
of the GFIN might equally be invoked by state regulators in the United 
States as undermining the legitimacy of the GFIN’s practice.94 
As an international body, the GFIN will obviously have impacts 
beyond the United States as well.  A realpolitik account of the GFIN might 
see it as a tool spearheaded by the FCA to ensure that subsequent regulatory 
sandboxes adopted in other countries do not offer significantly more relaxed 
regulatory environments, attracting fintech innovation away from London 
towards other jurisdictions.  Singapore and Hong Kong seem like 
particularly threatening potential rivals that the FCA may seek to hold in 
check with baseline standards – especially once London tech entrepreneurs 
will no longer have unfettered access to the continental European markets 
post-Brexit, and thus have less reason to stay in London.   
Speaking of the European markets, the European Banking 
Authority95 and the European Commission96 are reportedly contemplating 
the adoption of an EU-wide regulatory sandbox for fintech, but BaFin (the 
powerful German financial regulator) has expressed vocal opposition to 
91 GFIN Consultation Document, supra note 7 at 14. 
92 Newman & Posner, supra Note 77 at 4. 
93 Id. at 5.  
94 “There are plenty of instances when soft law or the bodies that produce it are framed as 
suffering from bias or lacking the technical expertise that others claim or the accountability 
expected in a democracy.” Id. at 26-7. 
95 Huw Jones, EU Guidelines on Fintech to Include “Sandbox” Design Recommendations 
REUTERS (Sep. 6, 2018) (available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-banks-
regulator/eu-guidelines-on-fintech-to-include-sandbox-design-recommendations-
idUSKCN1LM25V). 
96 European Commission, FinTech: Commission Takes Action for a More Competitive and 
Innovative Financial Market (Mar. 8, 2018) (available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-18-1403_en.htm). 
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regulatory sandboxes in general.97  Again, Newman & Posner’s explanation 
of “legitimacy claims” and the “arena expansion” second order effects of 
international soft law standards is helpful in exploring this dynamic.98  If the 
GFIN develops international best practices for regulatory sandboxes, then 
those could lend legitimacy to the structure that might assist sandbox 
proponents within Germany, and Europe more broadly, to overcome 
BaFin’s resistance.  BaFin might, however, seek to impugn the legitimacy of 
anything developed by the GFIN, particularly because neither BaFin nor any 
other European financial regulator (other than the FCA) is a member of the 
GFIN.  This absence of European regulators from GFIN is conspicuous – 
perhaps it can be attributed to tensions over Brexit, and the desire to limit 
any FCA ambitions to expand its arena of influence through GFIN even as it 
loses clout within the European Union. 
Speaking more generally, though, foreign examples of regulatory 
sandboxes are likely to lend legitimacy to those seeking to implement 
regulatory sandboxes in their own jurisdiction in order to prioritize the 
regulatory goals of innovation and competition99 (at the potential expense of 
consumer protection and financial stability).  In this sense, the GFIN may 
serve as a useful forum not only for policymakers and regulators, but also 
for innovators and industry associations lobbying to expand access to 
regulatory sandboxes100 – particularly because the GFIN has signaled that 
“being accountable to industry is important to GFIN.”101  
This more nuanced exploration of the GFIN portends a deregulatory 
trend in regulatory sandboxes, both because of the GFIN’s anticipated 
deference to industry interests,102 and because only regulators who have 
evinced “a commitment to supporting financial innovation” can become 
members of the GFIN.103 There is no place in the forum for regulators who 
are simply concerned by the impact that financial innovation might have on 
consumers or the stability of the financial system at large; this means that 
regulatory bodies that are more skeptical of fintech innovation may be left 
out of the conversation. (Other international financial regulatory 
97 Conheady, supra Note 10. 
98 Newman & Posner, supra Note 77 at 5. 
99 “[A] company might engage in a sophisticated strategy of sequencing wins in locations 
that can build leverage for taking on intransigent regulators in other important markets.” 
Pollman, supra Note 60 at 34. 
100 Pollman has noted that private sector entities will sometimes seek to change the law in 
circumstances where regulatory arbitrage will not achieve their business goals.  Pollman, 
supra Note 60 at 33. 
101 GFIN Terms of Reference, supra Note 33 at 7. 
102 The GFIN notes that “ While other stakeholders including industry, firms and private 
institutions are not formally a part of GFIN due to the conflict of interests, their views are 
welcome and necessary to ensure that GFIN remains relevant for all stakeholders.”  GFIN 
Terms of Reference, supra Note 33 at 7.  No mention is made of facilitating access for 
other stakeholders. 
103 Id. at 3. 
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organizations FSB or IOSCO, who focus (respectively) on financial stability 
and investor protection, have yet to take an active role in this space).104  
However, I have previously argued that – notwithstanding their deregulatory 
potential – an important argument can be made in favor of adopting 
regulatory sandboxes as a “trial for new regulatory approaches to coping 
with (rather than promoting) inevitable financial innovation.”105  In 
particular, regulators can use the sandbox to learn about nascent 
technologies that they will most likely have to grapple with at some point, 
irrespective of whether they adopt a regulatory sandbox.106  The remainder 
of this Part will consider how effective the GFIN, as well as the sandboxes 
created by Arizona and the CFPB, are likely to be in promoting regulatory 
learning in practice.  
Highlighting the importance of regulatory learning serves as an 
indictment of the CFPB’s proposed sandbox: if information sharing is 
viewed as the quid to the pro of lowered regulatory standards, then the 
CFBP’s proposal, which anticipates providing relief to “trade associations, 
service providers and other third parties” as well as individual firms, is 
clearly lacking.107  It is hard to envisage how a blanket regulatory exemption 
granted to a body like a trade association would facilitate the same degree of 
regulatory learning as a working relationship with an individual innovating 
firm.  Small subnational sandboxes like Arizona’s are also unlikely to 
produce any deep cross-sectoral regulatory knowledge, given that they are 
likely to trial only a few, disparate innovations.  Regulatory sandboxes 
should instead be designed to maximize information production and transfer 
– some sandboxes, such as the FCA’s, have features that are likely to make
them more successful at information production.108  Unfortunately, however, 
the developments discussed in this Part do not bode well for the sharing of 
information across sandbox boundaries.  
Particularly when it comes to technological innovations that may 
impact financial stability, the operators of small, subnational regulatory 
sandboxes (like Arizona) have limited incentives to share any information 
they may uncover during testing (financial stability is a borderless public 
good that will accrue largely to persons residing outside of their state).109  
Given that fintech markets are borderless, the ideal sandbox would facilitate 
104 See Note 31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the FSB’s and IOSCO’s current 
approaches to fintech innovation. 
105 Id. at __. 
106 Id. at __. 
107 See Note 82. 
108 “In the FCA sandbox, each firm will be allocated a dedicated case officer, and given “a 
high degree of bespoke engagement from [the FCA’s] staff”. Sandboxes, supra Note 2 at 
__, citing Christopher Woolard, Speech at the Innovate Finance Global Summit (Apr. 11, 
2016). 
109 Daniel Schwarcz and Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk In Insurance, 81 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1569, 1628 (2014). 
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information sharing at the international level.  However, there are likely to 
be impediments to transnational sharing of sensitive commercial 
information garnered from sandbox trials.  It is certainly true that financial 
regulators have shared information about regulatory best practices with one 
another for decades, at both the domestic and the international levels.110 
They have also shared information about market participants, but 
traditionally, the information shared has been germane to the financial 
condition of those firms.111  What is distinct about the regulatory sandbox is 
the constant dialogue between regulator and innovator about the 
development of new technology: as I have argued previously, “[i]t is this 
expectation of ongoing engagement that differentiates the regulatory 
sandbox from other regulatory waivers and exemptions.”112  As countries 
adopt regulatory sandboxes, sensitive information about technological 
developments will be pertinent to financial regulators not only in their 
capacity as regulators, but also in their capacity as facilitators of private 
firms’ innovation – a shift acknowledged by the GFIN.113  Some regulators 
may therefore want to keep information about technological innovation to 
themselves, fearing that if shared, it could be used to assist foreign firms 
competing in the fintech market.   
Carnegie & Carson’s recent paper on disclosures by nation states to 
the World Trade Organization provides a starting point for examining the 
“disclosure dilemmas” that arise when national authorities are called upon to 
share commercially sensitive information about the activities of their 
firms.114  As mentioned in the previous Section, coordination problems are 
110 In the United States, the law has generally favored the sharing of confidential business 
information amongst financial regulators, to the extent necessary for them to perform their 
functions. See, for example, William Michael Treanor, Applicability of Trade Secrets Act to 
Intra-Governmental Exchange of Regulatory Information, OPINIONS OF THE OFFICE 
OF LEGAL COUNSEL VOL. 23, 76 (Apr. 5, 1999) (available at 
https://www.justice.gov/file/19546/download).  Internationally, bodies like IOSCO and the 
FSB specify in their organizational documents that they exist in part to facilitate 
information exchange amongst national regulators.  See 
https://www.iosco.org/library/by_laws/pdf/IOSCO-By-Laws-Section-1-English.pdf; 
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-Charter-with-revised-Annex-FINAL.pdf. 
111 For example, the IMF notes that in its FSAP program (a program designed to identify 
the main vulnerabilities in a country that could trigger a financial crisis), “The most 
common confidential data typically provided to FSAP teams include bank-by-bank balance 
sheet, liquidity, and supervisory data used in stress tests and, in some cases, data on official 
reserves.” International Monetary Fund, Financial Sector Assessment Program: Frequently 
Asked Questions (Sep. 10, 2018) (available at  
https://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/faq/index.htm). 
112 Sandboxes, supra Note 2 at __. 
113 “A network of regulators from around the world that shares knowledge and best practice 
relating to innovation, technological trends and emerging issues represents an iterative 
change from the current mode of collaboration in this space.” GFIN Consultation 
Document, supra note 7 at 8. 
114 Allison Carnegie and Austin M. Carson, Trading Secrets: Disclosure Dilemmas in 
International Trade, 1 (Jul. 2, 2018) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3206689). 
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in part a function of (although not wholly attributable to) impediments to 
information sharing.115  One response to a coordination problem is to create 
a forum (like the GFIN) to facilitate information sharing.  However, merely 
creating a forum will not solve the problem when there are incentives to 
under-produce information.116  Such incentives are likely to be particularly 
strong when the information in question is highly sensitive commercial 
information about technological developments, and the intended recipients 
of that information are regulators in other jurisdictions who may pass that 
information on to innovators participating in their own sandboxes.  In such 
circumstances, we may witness a collective action problem,117 wherein even 
regulators otherwise motivated to cooperate may refuse to share information 
with their counterparts because of the expectation that other regulators will 
shirk their information-sharing obligations.  Such a dynamic will create a 
suboptimal situation where information is cloistered in individual regulatory 
sandboxes.   
Carnegie & Carson argue that, notwithstanding the general 
preference for transparency and accountability in international law, 
mechanisms to promote confidentiality and secrecy can be key to remedying 
collective action problems relating to the sharing of sensitive commercial 
information.118   They use the World Trade Organization as their case study, 
and discuss measures that it could take as an institution to protect sensitive 
information disclosed to it.119  Their proposals have merit in the WTO 
context, because there, the ultimate purpose of information sharing is to 
enable the WTO itself to resolve disputes.  However, if one accepts that the 
primary purpose of regulatory sandboxes should be to provide regulators 
with information, it would be insufficient to set up an international 
organization to be the confidential repository of such information, and stop 
the dissemination there.  In the sandbox context, what is needed are 
measures to ensure that regulators use the information they receive only for 
regulatory purposes, and not for assisting innovation by their private sector.  
Crafting and policing such measures would be extremely challenging, 
though, and so information sharing will likely be stymied by collective 
action problems unless regulators believe their incentives to share outweigh 
the drawbacks associated with possible technology transfers.   Decisions 
regarding information sharing may also be impacted by issues of legality 
under disparate international intellectual property regimes. 
115 See Notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
116 Carnegie and Carson, supra Note 114 at 3. 
117 Collective action problems “stem from certain possible divergences between what it is 
individually rational to do, absent coordination, on the one hand, and what would be both 
collectively and, therefore, individually optimal to do, were reliable means of coordination 
available, on the other hand.” Hockett, supra Note 64 at 2. 
118 Carnegie and Carson, supra Note 114 at 31. 
119 Id. at 2-3. 
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A regulator’s incentives to share information will depend in part on 
its motivations for adopting a regulatory sandbox in the first place.  If the 
regulator has implemented a regulatory sandbox purely in order to promote 
the efficiency and competitiveness of its own fintech industry, then it has 
limited incentives to share information.  If the regulator’s primary goal is to 
learn about new technologies in order to improve consumer protection 
and/or financial stability regulation, then information sharing regarding 
nascent technologies is more likely.  However, given that the adoption of 
most existing sandboxes appears to have been primarily motivated by 
concerns about efficiency and competitiveness, and that the GFIN by its 
terms excludes from its membership any regulator that has not demonstrated 
a commitment to promoting efficiency and competitiveness in the fintech 
space, there is little cause to be sanguine that the existence of the GFIN will 
prevent knowledge from being cloistered within national (and subnational) 
regulatory sandboxes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Essay has built on my previous work arguing that when it 
comes to nascent fintech technologies, the regulatory goals of financial 
stability and consumer protection should be prioritized over promoting 
efficiency and competition through innovation.  One practical corollary of 
this argument is that if a regulatory sandbox is to be adopted, it should be 
designed in a way that minimizes any rollback of prudential and consumer 
protection regulation, and maximizes the ability of financial regulators to 
learn about new technologies so that they are more informed in pursuing the 
regulatory goals of financial stability and consumer protection.  
Unfortunately, many of the sandboxes that have been implemented recently 
do not conform to this ideal – this Essay has demonstrated that the structures 
of the Arizona and CFPB regulatory sandboxes are unlikely to produce 
significant regulatory learning, and has argued that those sandboxes 
therefore do not compensate the public for the reduction in consumer 
protection and prudential regulations offered to innovators.  This Essay has 
also noted, however, that the deregulatory impact of these two sandboxes 
may be limited, because of practical constraints on their utility to innovators.  
Other sandboxes, such as the FCA’s, are both better (if not perfectly) 
designed and more appealing to innovators, but this Essay has argued that 
we should nonetheless be concerned about the fact that the regulators 
operating these sandboxes have incentives to jealously guard the 
information they produce, rather than sharing it across sandbox boundaries.  
Although the GFIN might initially seem like a forum that could facilitate 
cross-border information sharing, this Essay has argued that when the 
information in question is commercially sensitive intelligence about fintech 
innovations, the problem is more than a simple coordination problem.  
Instead, we are facing a collective action problem that the creation of the 
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GFIN is unlikely to solve.  The GFIN may even have a deleterious impact 
on consumer protection and financial stability regulation around the world, 
to the extent that it legitimizes the use of regulatory sandboxes even as it 
excludes skeptical regulators from its membership.  Overall, this Essay 
concludes that there is reason to be pessimistic about the trajectory of the 
regulatory sandbox model; the trend suggests that consumer protection and 
financial stability regulation are likely to be sacrificed in the name of 
promoting innovation. 
